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Telecommunications regulation in Hong Kong (China) is interesting as a case study of pro‐competitive regulation in a geographically small city of some 6.8 million people. It is also of particular interest because The Office of the Telecommunications Authority, the sector regulator, has for four years running (1999‐2002) been voted the best Asian regulator by readers of Telecom Asia. What policies were applied to warrant this sustained approval rating? This paper examines these policies and suggests further improvements.

This paper aims to give conclusions from the papers in the special issue about “Re‐thinking universal service in the digital era”.

A summary of the themes, trends and new concepts about universal service is compiled from the varied viewpoints introduced in the issue. The editors also appraise the mobile and broadband universal service candidates under the different perspectives in the issue, point out a number of questionable assumptions and gaps in the universal service stories, and touch on the international currents of influence in universal service policy. Finally, a succinct vision of a universal service policy for Europe is outlined.

This special issue aims to provide support to the policy process with regard to universal service in a digital context. The papers in the issue highlight developments that are shaking up the current universal service model. They consider universal service from a set of different dimensions, encompassing both demand and supply side considerations. Also a comparative outlook draws lessons from a representative set of existing regulatory models.

The paper provides a summary of the main avenues for the upcoming universal service policy debate.

Examines Spain’s problems in implementing regulatory reform and offers suggestions for addressing them. Hopes to be instructive to other countries embarking on regulatory reform. Concludes that other countries should concentrate on problems on implementation that they are likely to face and should be prepared for.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first to add to the debate on trust and opportunism within transaction cost economics (TCE) and second to describe a partial solution, a code of ethical practice (CoEP) originating in Kant's moral philosophy.

The methodology has centred on ethical values of right and wrong within an organisation in terms of fulfilling one's duty.

The contracting or exchange objective in any transaction is to arrive at a mutually satisfactory outcome, an equilibrium point. With opportunism, a free rider problem may well arise; if so, a partial solution emerges. This has to be avoided. In this paper, the authors focus on simple contracts as a solution, that is, an agreement‐as‐bargain in a CoEP not made in deed but made in reason, so that each party to the arrangement, has “dignity”. The avoidance of an ethical dilemma in not fulfilling one's duty is linked to the role of trust in TCE.

It is argued that the decision not to engage in opportunistic behaviour, for example, by any one individual, may be rooted in a personal sense of duty or influenced by the ethical values and beliefs embedded within the culture of the organisation or the firm. Management may therefore decide not to abuse their discretionary power; workers may opt not to shirk.

The paper builds on a new approach to understand governance and ethics insofar as a firm teaches people morality. This CoEP supports the role of trust in modern companies and links across to the literature on TCE. The paper should be of value to shareholders, workers and management, trade unions and commentators on the theory of the firm.

To identify differences in perceptions between executive sponsors (ESs) and project managers (PM) regarding sponsor involvement on projects, for the purposes of contributing to project management practice and encouraging further sponsor‐related research.

A survey of 365 executives and managers interested in project management investigated differences between ESs and PMs in perceived importance on eight dimensions of ES behavior and three dimensions of project success during the initiation stage of a project. This study followed a previous exploratory analysis study that identified sponsor behaviors. Factor analysis and t‐tests were used to develop variables and test for differences, respectively.

Results indicated significant differences between ESs and PMs on the perceived importance of ES involvement on the critical dimension of mentoring and assisting PMs with executives indicating higher importance.

Three specific suggestions are made which are directed toward improving project management practice. Further, additional research is encouraged on the role and influence of the ES in the initiating stage of the project management process.

The value of this research is two‐fold. One, the investigation identified a critical project management dimension on which sponsors and PMs differ, which may account for disruptive conflict during a project. Two, the present study adds to the limited body of research on the role of project sponsors.

The purpose of this paper is to identify concerns developing in regard to current approaches used to define, deliver and fund universal service obligations (USOs) for telecommunications due to developments in competition, new technology, e.g. wireless, convergence and next generation networks (NGN), including voice over internet protocol (VoIP). To stimulate thinking about the policies required to deliver USOs in an IP‐enabled NGN environment.

The paper examines the nature and scope of USOs, including the concept of “functional internet access” to address questions about whether in an NGN environment: present USOs are sustainable; USOs need to change; and whether USOs should include access to broadband? The paper also examines alternative/complementary sources of funding for USOs.

With falling revenue (due to increasing competition and declining prices) occurring alongside strong demand for funds to deploy NGN, telecommunications operators are less able to provide USOs sustained by cross‐subsidisation. Universal service funds, too, may be under pressure. Also there is likely to be an uneven migration to NGN since it is likely that NGN will be deployed first in more profitable, densely populated areas and then only later (if at all) in relatively less commercially viable rural/remote areas. The paper concludes that present USOs can be maintained in an NGN environment. It concludes that since USOs is an evolving concept, there should be regular systematic reviews of whether USOs should be extended to include broadband. The paper concludes that increased funding from general taxation revenue is warranted and would link decisions concerning the nature and scope of USOs more closely with financial responsibility for such decisions.

The paper stimulates rethinking about whether, and if so how, arrangements relating to USOs need to change? In adopting a longer term perspective of universal services, the paper may be a valuable complement to the reviews of USOs being conducted in various countries (since short term decisions should be consistent with longer term developments).

The current approach to universal service involving the provision of specific services (such as fixed voice, public payphones, ability to make emergency calls, etc.) needs re‐thinking in a convergent, NGN environment. This paper seeks to be part of that re‐thinking.

Questions addressed include: Should we move to a focus on universal access to communications infrastructure, allowing consumers to dictate preferred services? Since access to the full range of NGN services, including VoIP, requires broadband connection, should the scope of USOs be “upgraded” to include broadband?

A shift towards universal network access seems sensible provided that a number of conditions exist. One is that traditional services defined under universal service obligations (USOs), remain available. In particular, a shift to VoIP raises questions about whether present features of universal service (quality, ability to make emergency calls, etc) can be sustained. Another condition is widespread access to broadband. Another condition is that consumers are empowered to exercise the increased choice of services that will be available in an NGN environment. Such consumer empowerment requires that market power, information asymmetry, barriers to “switching”, as well as “systematic bias” in consumer decisions be effectively addressed.

Stimulates the policy reconsideration that is needed in regard to universal service in an NGN environment.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce to the concepts related with universal service and the papers in the special issue about “Re‐thinking universal service in the digital era”.

This special issue aims to provide support to the policy process with regard to universal service in a digital context. The papers in the issue highlight developments that are shaking up the current universal service model. They consider universal service from a set of different dimensions, encompassing both demand and supply side considerations. Also a comparative outlook draws lessons from a representative set of existing regulatory models.

The paper finds that the foundations and concept of universal service are experiencing a profound transformation as we enter into a new phase of information society development. A new set of policy goals and tools is the main consequence of this change.

The paper presents a timely account of the universal service policy debate.

The purpose of this paper is to use “best practice” regulatory principles to derive proposals for fostering competition in Thailand's telecommunications market.

On‐site research in Thailand was conducted, including interviews with a range of policy and regulatory agencies and telecommunications market participants.

The paper finds that Thailand's relatively late start in applying pro‐competitive regulation in the telecommunications sector presents an opportunity for installation of “regulatory leap‐frogging” measures proposed by the paper. The concession regime that prevails in Thailand is a major obstacle resulting in “gridlock” of Thailand's efforts to develop competition in the telecommunications sector. The Thai Constitution prohibits the regulator from directly regulating telecommunications companies operating on the basis of concessions that were in place prior to the adoption of the new telecommunications law. The paper examines this problem and points to a solution. Another major problem is the protracted absence of the National Broadcasting Commission that has been given joint responsibility (along with the National Telecommunications Commission) for spectrum management. Accordingly, pressing decisions regarding spectrum management cannot be made. The paper concludes that the two Commissions be merged (especially in the face of convergence). The paper finds that Thailand needs to develop and implement a national strategy for the development of communications infrastructure, including a collaborative approach to infrastructure development.

There are very few (if any) independent studies of policy and regulation of Thailand's telecommunications sector. More broadly, the paper indicates – by way of a case study – how “best practice” regulatory guidelines might be applied to enhance competition in developing countries.

This paper aims to examine the extent to which telecommunications consumers decide to switch and why.

Results from surveys of consumer switching behaviour in a number of countries are examined to ascertain reasons for actual consumer decision making regarding switching.

Implications for telecommunications regulation are considered. In essence, regulation should require that communications service providers ensure that switching is fast, cheap, predictable and reliable and that consumers are able to switch with minimum difficulty and delay.

The ability and willingness to switch from one to another supplier of telecommunications and internet services are an important aspect in manifesting consumer empowerment. In turn, empowered consumers are important for sustainable competition. If consumers are inert and passive, suppliers will not be under pressure to deliver the potential benefits of competition. And it is empowered assertive consumers, able and willing to switch, who will exert pressure on suppliers to deliver these benefits. Thus, in making well‐informed choices between suppliers, consumers not only benefit from competition but also initiate and sustain it.

Insights from behavioural economics are incorporated in the analysis.